"Инвестиции без демократии: роль институционализированных партий в обеспечении прав собственности в автократиях" (открытый семинар ЛИА по экономической теории)
Докладчик: С. Гельбах (University of Wisconsin)
An important but poorly understood feature of non-democracies is the use of institutionalized ruling parties as a way for autocrats to make credible commitments to investors. Such parties promote investment by solving collective-action problems among a designated party elite, who invest with the expectation that the autocrat will not attempt their expropriation. We derive conditions under which autocrats will want to create such parties, and predict that private investment performance and governance will be stronger in their presence. Qualitative evidence regarding the institutional evolution of the Chinese Communist Party and cross-national comparisons of non- democracies strongly support these predictions.
Статья к семинару: Investment Without Democracy: Ruling-Party Institutionalization and Credible Commitment in Autocracies, Scott Gehlbach, Philip Keefer, 2007 ( скачать)