"Reasons for Student Employment: Education Signaling Upside Down" (Law and Economics Group Research Seminar, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, Holland)
Докладчик: М. Юдкевич (ЛИА)
А.А. Апокин, М.М. Юдкевич
While classical Spence model predicts that diploma may serve as a signal at the labor market in the sense that more productive workers will get diploma and less productive ones will not, at the Russian labor market for students and young graduates the situation is rather reverse.
We present a model that explains why there exists such a widespread student employment in Russia with more able students being more active in seeking the job and starting their careers earlier, sacrificing the quality of education they get while striving to work full-time.
We take into account an endogeneity of effort requirement of education (that is due to the absence of educational standards enforcement) settled by universities, and demonstrate that alternative signaling by job experience may exist even if productivity increase from education is high enough. We use the employers' rationale to make an equilibrium refinement and to explain the features of equilibrium that emerge at Russian labor market for young labor force.